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In the specific area of productivity data and analysis, sim 
ple labor productivity measures for the economy (or even for 
the major sectors) are no longer sufficient with the changing 
patterns of availability and cost of various inputs—and 
especially in an economy which has moved away from a 
century-long dependence upon industrial equipment driven 
by cheap energy. Measures which relate output patterns to 
the inputs of labor, materials, energy and capital are deemed 
essential. These must be coupled with sound analyses of the 
realities of "tradeoffs" of the input factors which have (or 
could) contribute to improved efficiency and/or lowered 
cost—of production and of the finished product.
Productivity measures must reflect today's realities of do 
ing business. Most of the great strides in productivity gains 
over the past century have come from technological im 
provements and discoveries—the path to greater output per 
hour (labor productivity) is through new technologies to in 
vestment in new plant and machinery and on to more effi-
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cient labor. While it is true that improvements in industrial 
organization and behavior, as well as enlightened 
management-labor relationships, also contribute to gains in 
productivity, the main engine of productivity improvement 
is through capital.
People are said to be "inquisitive, acquisitive, and lazy." 
They are "inquisitive" and search out how to do their work 
better and more efficiently. They are "acquisitive" as they 
like to acquire the tools to do their jobs better. And, they are 
"lazy" in the sense that they would rather have machines 
sweat and toil than themselves. Productivity gains are not 
achieved by people working harder, but by giving them the 
tools to work more efficiently and by giving them the incen 
tives to do so.
Labor productivity is a partial productivity measure and, 
as such, does not reflect the role of capital and the interac 
tion between labor and capital. To quote the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) in the boxed-item of their periodic 
"Productivity and Costs" report,
Although the productivity measures relate output to 
the hours of all persons engaged in each sector, they do 
not measure the specific contributions of labor, capital, 
or any single factor of production. Rather, they reflect 
the joint effects of many influences, including new 
technology, capital investment, the level of output, 
capacity utilization, energy use, and managerial skill, as 
well as the skills and efforts of the work force.
The use of partial productivity measures is appropriate, 
depending upon the circumstances and their use. For gaug 
ing the efficiency of use of all resources, be it at the national 
level or at a company, productivity measures which include 
all inputs are the appropriate ones to use.
The making of policy, be it employment, inflation or out 
put, requires empirical measures which correctly reflect our
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economic conditions. Such measures will always include 
some degree of error, but the critical factor is that their 
trends should be as free from systematic biases as possible. 
This study will review several aspects of productivity 
measurement since such measures represent one of the main 
economic indicators of our economic well-being: the need 
for total factor productivity measures; the impact of our 
changing economic structure; the divergence between hours 
worked and hours paid; and the undermeasurement of labor 
in the real estate sector. Before embarking on the analytical 
sections, it is useful to review why productivity is so impor 
tant.
1. The "Big Picture"
The United States—and the entire free-world community 
of nations—is presently in a revolutionary situation. Unfor 
tunately, too few leaders of industry, academia or the 
government recognize this fact and its significance for the 
future. Specifically, in the late 1960s the U.S. was still the 
world's leader in world trade, in standard of living, in 
science and technology, in the world financial community, 
and in productivity. By the end of the decade of the 70s, due 
to a variety of errors of omission and commission together 
with events outside control of our national leaders, we were 
in the unenviable position of:
—Suffering three recessions in a single decade, with the 
terminal one (1980), in the judgment of some experts, conti 
nuing through 1981 and the first half of 1982.
—A complete catastrophe in productivity growth, with a 
slowdown followed by actual declines in output per hour in 
1978, 1979 and 1980 (and only about 1 percent rise in 1981).
—Rampant inflation, throughout the decade, with an in 
crease in the late 70s to levels higher than in any former 
peacetime period.
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—Unprecedentedly high interest rates, which stubbornly 
refuse conventional "cures"; and these rates in turn virtually 
assuring the collapse of the major construction sector and 
catastrophic declines in the sale and production of other ma 
jor consumer durables, particularly automobiles.
—Rates of unemployment higher than in any span since 
the "Great Depression" of the 30s.
—Tremendous loss of our "normal" international 
markets for manufactured goods, accompanied by a ma 
jor—and growing—invasion of the U.S. domestic market by 
imported manufactures, thus contributing to unemployment 
and the virtual collapse (present or almost certainly assured 
for the near future) of major mature U.S. industries.
—Persistent, very large adverse balance of payments.
As a result, the U.S. has lost its former lead in the export 
of manufactured goods, and its role as the financial 
bellwether or leader of the Western industrial world's finan 
cial community.
Due to the above combination of factors (not the least of 
which was our extremely weak comparative productivity 
growth performance) and including the apparent inability of 
U.S. leaders (of industry, labor and government) to work 
together to maximize exports, many of our basic industries 
were either already moribund or very ill indeed; and the U.S. 
living standard had already fallen to a measurable degree.
2. Total Factor Productivity Measures
The need for productivity measures that include the role 
of capital as well as labor has long been recognized by the 
economic community, especially Professors Kendrick, 
Jorgenson, Denison, and Griliches, among other productivi 
ty researchers. 1 Until recently, only labor productivity 
measures have been compiled and published on a regular 
basis by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the private
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business economy and six sectors. Since 1980, the American 
Productivity Center (APC) has been maintaining and 
publishing total factor productivity using Professor Ken- 
drick's approach. 2 The APC "Multiple Input Productivity 
Index" program covers the private business economy, six 
sectors, and thirty segments. Further, the APC measures of 
output and labor hours are consistent with the BLS 
measures.
Total factor productivity measures have been periodically 
published since the late 1950s. Yet, it wasn't until 1979 that 
the Rees Commission, under the auspices of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 3 recommended the continuous 
availability of productivity measures which also include the 
role of capital:
Measures of multifactor productivity show 
changes in the use of all measured inputs per unit of 
output. Measures of output per worker hour may 
increase only because inputs of capital or in 
termediate goods have been substituted for labor 
inputs. Thus, measures of productivity, which are 
more complete measures of changes in productive 
efficiency, generally rise less rapidly than measures 
of labor productivity.
In any measure of multifactor productivity, 
weights are needed to determine the shares of the 
various inputs in the aggregate input measure. 
These are ordinarily determined by the share of 
total input value in some base period. The panel 
recommended that BLS experiment with combining 
labor and other inputs into alternative measures of 
multifactor productivity. 4
The BLS has taken up this recommendation and is plan 
ning to publish total factor productivity measures for the 
private business and other major sectors by the end of 1982.
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It is understood that their measure of capital and their ap 
proach to adding up the inputs will differ from that used by 
the APC.
It should also be recognized that by including capital in 
productivity measures adds to the problems of measuring 
output and labor, (see Table I). The measurement of capital 
stock presents more difficulties than measuring output or 
labor hours, yet the approaches taken to measure capital are 
consistent and theoretically sound. Such measures, then, are 
appropriate in capturing broad trends in total and partial 
productivity. 5
Labor productivity measures have been telling a rather 
gloomy story of the progress of the U.S. economy since 
1965. Before 1965, labor productivity for the private 
business economy had been rising at an average annual rate 
of 3.2 percent. Between 1965 and 1973, the growth rate fell 
to 2.4 percent; labor productivity dropped even further 
through 1979 to only a 0.8 percent rate. During the recession 
years of 1979 through 1981, its rate again fell to 0.5 percent 
rate, (see Table II).
As dismal as past economic performance is, measured by 
labor productivity, the total factor measure is even gloomier. 
Its pre-1965 rate is some 19 percent lower than when only the 
role of labor is measured. Total factor productivity (TFP) 
grew at an average 2.6 percent rate, as compared to 3.2 per 
cent for labor productivity; over the 1965-73 period, the TFP 
rate was 1.8 percent. Between 1973 and 1979, TFP was only 
one-half the labor productivity rate, 0.4 percent, and since 
1979 TFP has been declining at a 0.4 percent rate while labor 
productivity has been increasing. Thus, when capital is in 
cluded in our measure of productivity, the performance of 
the U.S. economy is worse.
It is expected that TFP measures should show slower 
growth than labor productivity. When capital is substituted
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Table I






































































































SOURCES: American Productivity Center; Pace University.
NOTE: Goods producing includes manufacturing, farm, mining, and contract construc 
tion segments.
Service producing includes transportation, communications, public utilities, trade, finance 
and insurance, real estate, and services segment as defined by the American Productivity 
Center's Multiple Input Productivity approach.
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for labor, output may rise, leading to an increase in labor 
productivity. However, measured TFP would not rise as 
much since the increase in capital is also included in this 
measure. In this case, the rise in productive efficiency 
measured by labor productivity is overstated.
Table II 
Labor and Total Factor Productivity
Private Business Economy 





































SOURCES: American Productivity Center; Pace University.
The Post-1965 Slowdown. The falloff in productivity 
growth rates since 1965, as well as some likely causes, has 
been well-documented elsewhere. 6 As exhibited by Table II, 
both the partial labor productivity and TFP rates have con 
sistently declined in each of the post-war subperiods: in this 
case too, labor productivity understates the slowdown. Be 
tween the 1948-65 and 1965-73 subperiods, labor productivi 
ty growth rates dropped 0.8 percentage points, or declined 25 
percent. In contrast, total factor productivity growth rates 
fell 31 percent. The 1973-79 subperiod exhibited an even 
more severe falloff in its productivity performance from the 
previous period, declining 67 percent. Again, the TFP rate 
slowed down even more, 78 percent.
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The moderation in productivity rates continued after 
1979, but much of this poor performance can be associated 
with the two (or possibly one) recessions, the last of which 
we are still experiencing at the time of this writing. It should 
be noted, however, that the recent year-to-year performance 
of productivity is slightly encouraging. In 1981, labor pro 
ductivity reversed its decline of the previous years, and rose 
at a 1 percent rate. Total factor productivity also increased 
after several years of declines, at a somewhat milder rate of 
0.4 percent. In measuring the post-1965 slowdown of pro 
ductivity, we again see that it has been much more severe 
when gauged by the more inclusive total factor productivity 
measure than when looking at labor productivity only.
3. The Changing Economic Structure
The structure of the U.S. economy has been changing over 
the post-World War II period, reflecting changing tastes and 
preferences, new technologies and products, altered resource 
availability and costs, the impact of taxes and other govern 
ment economic and social policies, as well as increasing 
foreign competition. As the economy shifts from a goods- 
producing to a more service-producing economy, these shifts 
alone would affect measured productivity.
For example, in 1950 over 17 percent of all hours worked 
were in the farm sector; by 1965 the farm sector contributed 
only 8 percent to total private business labor input. Much of 
this shift in labor was to the service-producing sector. Such a 
shift would affect measured productivity even if within each 
sector productivity did not change.
Table II presents the shifts in the U.S. private business 
economy over the past 33 years. In terms of output, there 
was hardly any change in the economy's structure between 
1950 and 1965; about 46 percent of output was from the 
goods-producing sector and 54 percent from service-
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producing industries. (There was a slight shift from the farm 
sector to manufacturing.) Between 1965 and 1975, the 
economy incurred a substantial change in its structure. Dur 
ing this tumultuous 10-year period, the goods-producing sec 
tor's share of output dropped to 41 percent, a decline of 5 
percentage points. The U.S. economy became more service- 
oriented, currently producing about 59 percent of output. 
Further, the manufacturing industries' contribution dropped 
back to its 1950 share of 31 percent.
Examination of the changing proportions of labor and 
capital inputs among the major sectors of the private 
business economy tells the same story: the U.S. is an increas 
ingly service-oriented economy. As of 1981, 60 percent of 
labor's efforts and over 66 percent of the capital stock is 
devoted to service-oriented activities including transporta 
tion, communications, public utilities, wholesale and retail 
trade, finance, insurance, real estate, and business services. 
The farm sector's claim on resources dropped dramatically 
between 1950 and 1975, but has now stabilized. (The shift 
from farm to other activities is now over and has been for 
many years.) Manufacturing continues to claim resources 
very much in the same proportions in 1981 as it did in 1950.
The Impact of Services. The question then is how this shift 
from goods- to service-producing industries has affected 
measured productivity. Many of the more serious problems 
in measuring real output and capital inputs are associated 
with the service-producing sector: defining and measuring 
real output, and defining and measuring real capital stock; 
even measuring labor inputs for the service-oriented in 
dustries is more difficult. We will see that the real estate sec 
tor is a case in point. Basically, most of services deal with in 
tangible types of outputs: financial advice, the sale of a 
house, accounting services, even economic consulting. It is 
very difficult to define what is the output of a particular ser-
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vice. It is even more difficult to measure price changes in 
order to deflate the output data.
Some analysts have attributed a proportion of the 
slowdown in productivity growth to the shift from the 
"more productive" goods-producing to the "less produc 
tive" service-producing industries. One reason many 
analysts consider service industries to be less productive is 
that output measures may be underestimated, leading to 
downward biased productivity measures. In order to ex 
amine this question, our measure of total factor productivity 
for private business economy was recalculated, holding the 
proportion of output, labor and capital inputs at their 1965 
levels (see Tables I and III).
The impact of the changing economic structure on total 
factor productivity is exhibited by Chart I. Between 1948 and 
1965 there is a marked difference in the trends of the variable 
structure total factor productivity (VS-TFP) and the con 
stant structure total factor productivity (CS-TFP). After that 
period, there is very little difference in their respective 
trends. The growth rates of TFP bear this fact out (see Table 
IV); between 1948 and 1965, VS-TFP grew at an average rate 
of 2.6 percent, some 12 percent lower than the 2.9 percent 
rate of TFP when the structure is held constant. Over the 
post-1965 subperiods, the rates of growth of both VS-TFP 
and CS-TFP are almost exactly the same.
During this earlier 1948-65 period, the proportion of out 
put changed but little (see Table I); the same is true in regard 
to capital input. The significant changes occurred in the pro 
portion of labor hours; labor hours in the goods-producing 
sector declined almost 8 percentage points, from 55.3 per 
cent in 1950 to 47.6 percent in 1965. Of course, the service- 
producing sector gained this amount. Between 1965 and 1975 
the goods-producing sector again lost share, about 6 percent, 
dropping to 41.8 percent.
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Table III




Manufacturing .325 .318 .179
Food .032 .031 .017
Tobacco .005 .001 .002
Textiles .010 .016 .007
Apparel .011 .021 .003
Lumber .011 .012 .003
Furniture .005 .007 .002
Paper .011 .012 .011
Printing and publishing .018 .017 .005
Chemicals .020 .016 .020
Petroleum .008 .003 .011
Rubber .009 .009 .004
Leather .003 .006 .001
Stone, clay and glass .012 .011 .008
Primary metals .030 .022 .029
Fabricated metals .024 .025 .010
Machinery excluding electric .034 .032 .016
Electrical machinery .025 .028 .009
Transportation equipment .044 .034 .017
Instruments .008 .008 .003
Miscellaneous manufacturers .005 .007 .002
Nonfarm nonmanufacturing .541 .524 .619
Mining .022 .012 .043
Contract construction .075 .064 .012
Transportation .051 .050 .070
Communications .023 .015 .027
Public utilities .027 .011 .061
Trade .203 .255 .077
Finance and insurance .049 .041 .015
Real estate .061 .012 .193
Services .127 .140 .176
SOURCES: American Productivity Center; Pace University.
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Table IV 
Total Factor Productivity and Related Indexes
by Major Sector 
(Selected Periods, 1948-1981)
Average Annual Rates of Change 
1948-79 1948-65 1965-73 1973-79 1979-81
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Table IV (continued) 
Total Factor Productivity and Related Indexes
by Major Sector 
(Selected Periods, 1948-1981)
Average Annual Rates of Change 
1948-79 1948-65 1965-73 1973-79 1979-81









































































































SOURCES: American Productivity Center; Pace University.
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This significant gain in the service-producing sector's 
share of labor hours is reflected in the differing growth rates 
of variable structure labor productivity and constant struc 
ture labor productivity. During each of the four post-war 
subperiods examined, when the structure of output and 
labor input are held constant, the rates of growth of labor 
productivity are significantly lower. And the divergence in 
their respective growth rates increases as we approach the 
1980s. Thus, the shift from a goods- to a service-oriented 
economy has had a significant impact on labor productivity 
throughout the 1948-81 period, but not significant after 1965 
when productivity is measured using the total factor ap 
proach.
Again, we see the importance of including capital in the 
measure of productivity. Interestingly, there is little dif 
ference in capital productivity growth rates between the 
variable and constant structure measures.
Output and Inputs. Table IV also presents the impact on 
output and labor and capital input growth rates for all three 
series; and for each subperiod, when the structure is held 
constant, the growth rates are lower than in the variable 
structure case. This result is expected since an economy nor 
mally shifts output and resources to industries which are ex 
periencing greater growth in demand. Further, higher pro 
ductivity growth industries tend to have slower rising prices, 
which encourages increasing demand and output, and higher 
profit margins, which also encourages and attracts more 
resources.
Translating these increases in output, labor and capital in 
to faster-rising productivity depends upon their relative 
growth rates. As we saw, the major divergence was in regard 
to labor productivity, the difference in output growth rates 
(1948-65) was only 0.1 percentage points, yet labor input 
declined at a Q.I percentage rate when when the structure
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was held constant, as compared to an actual (variable struc 
ture) use of 0.4 percent per annum. The divergence in capital 
input growth rates over this same period was also minimal, 
0.1 percentage points. Here, too, we see that the strong shift 
in labor explains the divergence in labor productivity growth 
rates.
Within-Sector Shifts. Shifts of output and inputs within a 
sector will also impact its measured productivity growth 
rates. Apparently shifts within the goods-producing sector 
had a substantial impact on total factor productivity growth 
rates over the 1948-65 subperiod, 3.1 percent versus 3.8 per 
cent for the variable and constant structures, respectively. 
After that period, the differences are much smaller. Much of 
this difference in the early period can be attributed to shifts 
in labor among the goods-producing sectors. Since there is 
only a small difference in manufacturing VS-TFP and CS- 
TFP growth rates, most of the divergence within the goods- 
producing sector must be due to the shift from farm to non- 
farm labor in the early post-war period.
Within the service-producing sector, there is very little dif 
ference in growth rates of VS-TFP and CS-TFP. Apparent 
ly, there have been only small shifts of labor, and output and 
capital, within this sector.
Rate, Level and Interaction Effects. Gains in productivity 
can be separated into rate, level and interaction effects. The 
rate effect is the growth in productivity due to within- 
industry productivity gains. The level effect is due to shifts in 
the composition or structure of the economy, holding 
within-industry productivity constant. The interaction effect 
is a result of the interaction between the rate and level ef 
fects.
The estimates of constant structure growth rates presented 
above are approximations of the rate effect. Unfortunately, 
there is no approach available to decompose total factor pro-
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ductivity into rate, level and interaction effects. However, it 
is possible to do so for labor productivity. 7 Using a 60-sector 
disaggregation, Beebe and Haltmaier estimate the rate and 
level effects for selected subperiods: 8
Decomposition of labor productivity 




Total 3.24 2.54 1.00 
Rate 2.79 2.22 0.93 
Level 0.45 0.33 0.10
This table indicates that the level effect accounted for 13.9 
percent of the rate of productivity growth between 1948 and 
1965, 13 percent over the 1965-73 period, and 10 percent 
over the 1973-78 period. In order to isolate which sectors ac 
count for the level effect, Beebe and Haltmaier use a two- 
sector approach, isolating each sector in a separate calcula 
tion. Their findings are that farming accounts for most of 
the level effect, especially in the earliest subperiod, 0.41, 
0.18, and 0.05, for the three subperiods, respectively. Our 
constant-structure approach agrees with their findings.
4. The Hours Paid Bias
The BLS establishment survey known as the Current 
Employment Statistics Survey (709), has three major prob 
lems in regards to productivity measurement:
1. Self-employed and unpaid family workers are excluded. 
In the BLS sector estimates and the APC sector/industry 
estimates of productivity, self-employed and unpaid family 
workers are included, albeit using indirect methods. In con 
trast, direct industry estimates would be based on imputa 
tions by sector of self-employed and unpaid family worker
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employment, using estimates from the Current Population 
Survey. At least this source of bias is addressed.
2. Average hours estimates cover only production workers 
in mining and manufacturing, and all nonsupervisory 
workers in other industries. Generally, in calculating total 
hours worked, average hours of supervisory (nonproduc- 
tion) are assumed to be the same as nonsupervisory (produc 
tion) workers. As of 1977, about 18 percent of total workers 
in nonagricultural industries, and about 28 percent of mining 
and manufacturing workers had their hours estimated under 
this assumption. It is not clear what direction this assump 
tion would bias our productivity measures, if any. The trend 
has been towards working less hours per week, at least until 
the early 1960s. This trend applies to both supervisory and 
nonsupervisory workers. More likely, these estimates lead to 
a cyclical bias in that production workers' hours are lowered 
during business downturns, but nonproduction personnel 
hours generally stay the same.
3. The major problem is that the establishment survey 
measures hours paid instead of hours worked. Hours paid 
includes vacations, sick-leave, holidays, coffee breaks, and 
the like. If the difference between hours paid and worked 
had stayed the same since 1948, productivity trends would 
not be affected, and only productivity levels would be biased 
downwards.
But in reality the trend has been towards more hours that 
are paid but do not represent work. Evidence on this trend is 
sketchy but very convincing. In 1966, 83 percent of total 
compensation was for working time (all nonagricultural in 
dustries, see Table V). By 1970 this figure dropped to 81.9 
percent, and to 76.7 percent by 1977, the last year such infor 
mation was published. During this same period, pay for 
leave excluding sick went from 5.2 percent of total compen 
sation to 6.1 percent. Other evidence indicates that between
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1965 and 1976, the maximum allowable vacation of plant 
workers rose from 3.3 weeks per annum to 3.9 weeks, and 
from 3.6 weeks to 4.1 weeks for office workers. 9
This problem was addressed as early as 1976 by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. 10 They recognized the impact this bias 
has on productivity measures and they attempted to rectify 
for the lack of hours worked data. After reviewing the 
several employment surveys conducted by the federal 
government, they recommended that the Current Employ 
ment Statistics Survey be expanded to include hours worked 
information.''
Table V
Percent of Total Compensation




Activity 1966 1970 1974 1977
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Pay for working time 83.0 81.9 78.2 76.7 
Pay for leave
(excluding sick) 5.2 5.6 6.0 6.1 
Vacation 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.4 
Holidays 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.3
Employer expenditures

















SOURCE: Handbook of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2070, U.S. Department of Labor, Table 
132, "Employee Compensation, Private Nonagricultural Economy, Selected Years, 
1966-77," December 1980, pp. 308-318.
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In their approach to defining what comprised hours work 
ed, they had several somewhat competing uses in mind, in 
cluding labor negotiations and productivity measurement. 
They finally recommended the use of the concept "hours at 
work," which they defined as "all time during which an 
employee is necessarily required to be on the employer's 
premises, on duty, or at a prescribed work place." 12
In addition to regular working time where the 
employee is engaged in productive activity, hours at 
work thus include short rest periods and coffee 
breaks, standby or ready time, downtime, portal to 
portal pay only if paid, washup time only if paid, 
travel time from job site to job site within the work 
ing day, travel away from home if it cuts across the 
working day, and paid training periods during 
working hours. Hours at work exclude normal 
travel time from home to work, unpaid wash time, 
and lunch time . . . the major items excluded from 
hours at work are vacations, holidays, and 
absences due to sickness or personal or civic 
reasons. 113
About 90 percent of paid but not at-work time is due to 
vacations. This definition does include some nonwork time 
which would be better excluded for productivity measure 
ment purposes, but these items represent a very small pro 
portion of nonwork time.
For illustrative purposes, estimated total hours paid for 
the nonfarm sector were adjusted to an hours worked basis. 
The adjustment is based on the evidence given in the BLS 
Report. 14 This table indicates that hours worked were 95.2 
percent of hours paid in 1952, and declined an average of 0.1 
percentage points per annum through 1966, the same annual 
percentage point decline as presented in Table V. Taking the 
1952 figure of 95.2 percent as a benchmark, we assumed
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through extrapolation that hours worked were 95.6 percent 
of hours paid in 1948, and 92.3 percent in 1981. (All in 
tervening years were linearly interpolated.)
Labor productivity and total factor productivity were 
calculated using adjusted hours worked labor input. Chart II 
shows the trends in the hours worked and hours paid 
measures of total factor productivity (assuming both 
measures are equal to 100 in 1948). It is clear that the hours 
paid measures are an underestimate of TFP, and that this 
bias increases over time.
The differences in rates of growth for the nonfarm sector 
are not very large, no more than 2 percentage points (see 
Table VI). But over long periods of time, small percentage 
differences in growth rates lead to substantial differences in 
levels. For example, if it is assumed that total factor produc 
tivity using hours worked and hours paid measures were 
equal in 1948—as was done for Chart II—hours paid TFP 
would rise 61.8 percent by 1981 (at a 1.5 percent rate) and 
hours worked TFP, 71.2 percent (at a 1.6 percent rate). The 
gap between these two measures widens steadily over time 
and reaches 5.8 percent by 1981.
Using hours paid rather than hours worked leads to an 
understatement of both the level and the rate of growth of 
total factor productivity and labor productivity. While this 
conclusion implies that the productivity problem facing the 
U.S. economy is not as bad as has been measured by current 
ly available data, we still must conclude that since 1965 pro 
ductivity gains have slowed down substantially and that since 
1973 they have been nonexistent.
Stafford and Duncan report that their survey "shows that 
the divergence between hours worked and hours paid ac 
counts for as much as one-third of the productivity 
slowdown." 15 Further, Norsworthy etal. report that the rate 
of change in the ratio of hours worked to hours paid for the
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Chart II
Total Factor Productivity







SOURCE: American Productivity Center.
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private nonfarm business sector was -0.06 percent from 1952 
to 1965, -0.21 for 1965 to 1973, and -0.12 from 1973 to
1975. 16
They conclude that the results are "not striking" but that 
there "is a small, persistent but variable decline in the ratio 
of hours worked to hours paid." 17 Neither we nor Nors- 
worthy attribute a significant proportion of the decline in 
productivity to the divergence between hours worked and 
hours paid. However, we are in agreement that the BLS 
should continue with their plans to expand their survey to in 
clude hours worked.
Table VI
Total Factor Productivity 
Nonfarm Sector
A. Growth Rates, Selected Periods 






B. Percent Difference in Hours Worked 
and Hours Paid**






SOURCES: The American Productivity Center; Pace University.
*For illustrative purposes only.
**Assumes that both measures equal each other in 1948.
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5. Underestimate of Labor in the Real Estate Sector
There is evidence that the Current Employment Statistics 
program underestimates labor hours in the real estate sector. 
Traditionally, much of the effort in this sector is by in 
dividuals working on a commission basis and on their own 
time. The establishment survey apparently underestimates 
the amount of labor effort by nqnpayroll personnel and, as 
such, undercounts the number of employees.
Information provided by the National Association of 
Realtors (NAR) 18 indicates that the BLS survey is only cap 
turing approximately 16 percent of the total labor force in 
this sector, which implies that a more correct estimate of real 
estate labor is about six times the published figure. Another 
source of underestimation is the average hours paid (worked) 
per week. Currently, only nonsupervisory workers are 
covered, and real estate is not broken out from the broader 
finance, insurance, and real estate sector. Therefore, this 
estimate of average hours must be used in calculating total 
real estate labor hours.
Table VII presents employee information provided by the 
NAR. 19 About 84 percent of the total workforce is made up 
of salespersons, and only 16 percent are in-office personnel. 
This number appears to be fairly stable over the 1976-81 
period. Unfortunately, no data is available prior to 1976 so 
no trend can reasonably be inferred.
The BLS estimates that nonsupervisory workers are paid 
for an average of 36 hours per week. Real estate salespersons 
average over 40 hours according to NAR surveys, and 
brokers over 50 hours per week. Here, too, we have a rather 
significant understatement of employee activity in this sec 
tor.
Finally, the distribution of gross income indicates that 
some 13 percent goes to cover payroll-type costs, and 45 per-
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cent to commissions, adding up to total labor costs of 58 per 
cent. This proportion is way below estimates of labor's share 
of total factor costs as compiled from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. In 1978 the APC has calculated that 
labor compensation, after an imputation for self-employed 
is added on, was only 8 percent of total factor costs, way 
below the figure implied by NAR data.
The data provided by the NAR are compelling. Two fac 
tors ar highlighted which signal likely labor measurement 
problems for the real estate sector:
1. The level of real output per hour for the real estate sec 
tor is almost 40 percent higher than any other nonfarm 
nonmanufacturing sector. (In 1979, output per hour 
was $27.42—in 1972 dollars—as compared to $19.76 for 
public utilities.)
2. Labor's share of factor income is the lowest of all non- 
farm nonmanufacturing sectors. (In 1978, real estate's 
labor share was 8 percent, about one-fourth the 36.5 
percent labor share of the public utility sector.)
Unfortunately, the data provided by the NAR survey 
would lead to hour and employee estimates which are 
unrealistically high. Using their data and adjusting BLS 
estimates of the number of employees and average hours for 
real estate, we would derive estimates of aggregate hours of 
13.6 billion and employment of 6.4 million workers. Even 
though these estimates are not acceptable, the NAR survey 
results do indicate that there is a substantial underestimate of 
labor effort in the real estate sector.





1. Employment by Type
(Percent of workforce)
1976 1978
Salespersons 82.2% 84.0% 












2. Distribution of Hours per Week 
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Percent Percent 




under 40 40 & over
45.9 54.1 
23.3 76.7










Total labor costs 58.1 58.3 
Other costs (occupancy, 
communications, advertising, 
sales promotion, etc.) 41.9 41.7
























SOURCES: National Association of Realtors; The American Productivity Center; Pace 
University.
a. Realtor associates, salespersons and brokers.
b. Nonsupervisory worker, Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate.
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6. Conclusion and Recommendations
In the specific field of employment and hours data, as 
generated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, several conclu 
sions are apparent:
1. To properly capture gains in productive efficiency, the 
role of capital must be included at the sector level, and in 
termediate materials and energy inputs should be added if 
measuring productivity at more detailed levels. Because of 
substitution among the various inputs, labor productivity 
measures are biased upwards.
2. The shift from a goods-producing to a service-oriented 
economy had a significant effect on measured productivity 
in the early part of the post-World War II era, but has not 
affected productivity growth rates since 1965. If productivity 
is measured by labor productivity, there appear to have been 
labor-shift effects since 1965, but these effects are incorrect. 
The shift to more services has not contributed significantly 
to the post-1965 productivity slowdown.
3. The current practice of estimating hours paid rather 
than hours worked by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
significantly biases productivity growth rates downwards. 
While the bias is significant, it does not account for the 
post-1965 productivity slowdown.
4. For some sectors—especially the real estate sector—the 
true aggregate of hours devoted to gainful endeavor and the 
number of persons involved in generating the value-added 
"output" for the sector is seriously understated by the BLS 
exclusion of "non-office sales personnel." This exclusion 
undoubtedly exerts some effect in a number of the service in 
dustries, but is especially serious for real estate. According to 
the National Association of Realtors data, not less than 
three-fourths of the total number of persons gainfully 
employed by the industry (and probably an even larger
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percentage of the hours actually worked) are non-office sales 
personnel, paid for either entirely or very largely on a com 
mission basis. With this exclusion, the computation of a 
meaningful productivity level (output per hour) is not possi 
ble; and with an output per hour trend based on perhaps 20 
to 25 percent of the total human resources input, the validity 
is indeed questionable.
The technical problems reviewed here are important but 
should not detract us from some basic economic problems 
facing the U.S. economy. Our declining productivity perfor 
mance, which is clearly evident regardless of any biases in 
estimation, continues to erode our national vitality and inter 
national competitiveness. While the technical recommenda 
tions are clear—measure total factor productivity and 
measure hours at work—how we can revive our economy's 
efficiency of operation is more difficult to fathom.
As matters stand, it is obvious that the U.S. industrial 
community of the future will inevitably be altogether dif 
ferent from that of the past. If we are to avoid the fate of na 
tions in the past who fell from the position of world leader 
ship to the status of third-rate or fourth-rate powers, we 
must:
*Develop new—and high-technology—industries and ex 
pand them rapidly;
* Carry out wide-ranging actions to maximize productivi 
ty, flexibility and general acceptance of change and new ap 
proaches in existing, mature industry;
* Substantially increase diffusion throughout every seg 
ment of the industrial community of "best practice";
*Encourage development of the requisite new skills re 
quired for new high-tech industries and for the more 
automated, robotized plants of the future in extant in 
dustries;
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* Direct improvements in productivity and general opera 
tional efficiency in the growing service industry segment of 
the economy.
In addition to industrial restructuring toward services and 
technology-oriented industries and improvements in its 
overall effectiveness, it appears essential that new and im 
aginative approaches be shaped for on-going collaboration 
of the government, industry and labor to expand U.S. 
fabricated goods exports in the world marketplace, plus ef 
fective action in exporting efficient, flexible U.S. "services," 
including transportation, communications, finance and pro 
fessional services.
Further, it appears likely that the U.S. will also be 
able—as it must—to expand further its still-extant lead in the 
production and export of agricultural products. Here, again, 
new technologies (including hydroponics, photosynthesis 
and bioregulators) will be required to meet the needs of the 
twenty-first century and to help assure retention by the U.S. 
of at least a relatively high standard of living.
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